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The aim of this study was to develop a Self-Talk Inventory for young adults. This inventory
consisted of two scales. The Negative Self-Talk Scale included three categories of self-
talk (depressive, anxious, and angry thoughts) and the Positive Self-Talk Scale, three
categories (minimization, positive orientation, and coping self-instructions). Participants
were 982 undergraduate students (Mean age = 20.35 years, SD = 2.16). They completed
the self-talk scales together with the following scales to measure symptoms of affective
disorders: the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), and the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-
T). Factor analyses confirmed the hypothesized structure for the Self-Talk Inventory. The
relations between self-talk and symptoms of affective disorders (depression, anxiety, and
anger) were also evaluated. In general, states-of-mind –SOM– ratios and negative cognitions
showed a greater association with psychological symptoms than did positive cognitions.
Results concerning the cognitive characteristics of depression, anxiety, and anger were
mixed and partially supported the cognitive content specificity theory. 
Keywords: self-talk, SOM ratios, cognitive specificity, depression, anxiety, anger
El objetivo de este estudio fue el desarrollo de un inventario de autodiálogo para jóvenes
adultos. Este inventario consistió en dos escalas. La Escala de Autodiálogo Negativo
incluyó tres categorías de autodiálogo (pensamiento depresivo, ansioso, y relacionado
con la ira) y la Escala de Autodiálogo Positivo otras tres (minimización, afecto positivo
y autoinstrucciones de afrontamiento). Los participantes fueron 982 estudiantes (Edad
Media = 20.35 años, DT = 2.16). Completaron las escalas de Autodiálogo junto con la
Escala de Depresión del Centro para Estudios Epidemiológicos (CES-D), el Inventario
Estado-Rasgo de Ansiedad (STAI) y el Inventario de Expresión de la Ira Estado-Rasgo
(STAXI-T). Los análisis factoriales confirmaron la estructura hipotética del inventario de
Autodiálogo. La relación entre autodiálogo y síntomas de trastornos afectivos (depresión,
ansiedad e ira) también se evaluó. En general, la ratio de los Estados de la Mente –
SOM – y las cogniciones negativas mostraron una mayor asociación con los síntomas
psicológicos que las cogniciones positivas. Se obtuvieron resultados mixtos acerca de
las características cognitivas de la depresión, ansiedad e ira y estos apoyaron parcialmente
la teoría de la especificidad del contenido cognitivo.
Palabras clave: autodiálogo, SOM ratios, especificidad cognitiva, depresión, ansiedad, ira
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Cognitive-behavioral models emphasize the link between
inner speech and the development of affective disorders
(Beck, 1976). This relation has been examined mainly from
two different, but complementary, perspectives. One approach
has focused on the assessment of the influence of the positive
versus negative valence of thinking on psychological
maladjustment. The second has emerged around the cognitive
content-specificity hypothesis and has attempted to determine
whether each affective disorder (i.e., depression and anxiety)
is characterized by cognitions of different content.
Concerning the role of the valence, three hypotheses
have been proposed: The first hypothesis suggests that
positive thinking is the most predictive of psychological
adjustment. Although some studies have found evidence for
this position (e.g., Burnett, 1996), most have found results
that support a second hypothesis that posits the greater
influence of negative thinking on psychopathological
disorders. Kendall (1984) called this phenomenon “the power
of nonnegative thinking” and suggested that a lower
frequency of negative thoughts, as opposed to the presence
of positive ones, is more relevant to differentiate emotionally
normal from maladapted groups. This hypothesis has
received empirical support from several studies (e.g., Ronan,
Kendall, & Rowe, 1994; Treadwell & Kendall, 1996). A
third hypothesis, Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1986) states-
of-mind (SOM) model of cognitive balance, establishes that
a specific proportion of negative-to-positive self-statements
accounts for optimal emotional adjustment, and that
dysfunction occurs when this ratio shifts. SOM ratios are
usually obtained by dividing positive self-statement scores
by positive-plus-negative self-statement scores. In a
reformulated version of the SOM model, the optimal balance
between positive and negative self-talk was assumed to
approximate a ratio ranging from .67 to .90 (Schwartz, 1997).
Although a number of studies have obtained support for this
model, adjustment to the ratios proposed by Schwartz seems
to depend on the method employed to assess self-talk (self-
report vs. thought-listing) and the categories of thinking
evaluated (Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002; Ronan & Kendall,
1997). 
The influence of self-talk on psychopathology has also
been examined from the cognitive specificity theory. Beck’s
(1976) cognitive model stipulated that each emotional
disorder could be characterized by a cognitive content that
is specific to that disorder. According to this theory,
depression is characterized by predominance of negative
cognitions in the form of pervasive, absolutistic statements
about themes of loss, deprivation, failure, and personal
inadequacy, whereas in anxiety, the cognitions reflect possible
harm and danger in a more situational, probabilistic, and
anticipatory way (Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind,
1987; Clark, Beck, & Brown, 1989). 
Although the cognitive characteristics of anger have
received less attention than those of depression and anxiety,
social-cognitive models of aggression have proposed that
aggressive people have distorted perceptions of others and
of themselves. For example, aggressive children tend to
perceive negative intentions in other people but to
underestimate their own responsibility for the conflict (Dodge
& Crick, 1990). In addition, recent studies indicate that
positive self-systems predict aggression (Edens, Cavell, &
Hughes, 1999). 
The cognitive content-specificity hypothesis has focused
on the differentiation of depression and anxiety, and a
number of studies have provided at least partial support for
the idea that the cognitions of anxious and depressed
individuals are different (Beck et al., 1987; Clark, Beck, &
Steward, 1990; Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan,
1987). However, to distinguish anxious from depressive self-
talk is difficult because of the overlap between anxiety and
depression (Safren, Heimberg, Lerner, Warman, & Kendall,
2000). For example, on average, self-report measures of
these disorders correlate between .62 and .70 (Clark, Steer,
& Beck, 1994). Clark and Watson (1991) offered an
explanation for the high positive correlation between
depression and anxiety measures. On the basis of their
tripartite model of anxiety and depression, they stated that
these measures actually assess a large, common, nonspecific
distress factor, called negative affect. This factor was defined
as the extent to which a person reports feeling upset or
unpleasantly aroused, distressed, fearful, hostile, and nervous.
The tripartite model also posits another two dimensions,
referred to as positive affect and physiological arousal.
Positive affect reflects one’s level of pleasant engagement
with the environment and has components of well-being,
energy, affiliation, and adventurousness (Clark & Watson,
1991). According to this model, low positive affect would
be unique to depression whereas physiological arousal would
be relatively unique to anxiety.
A number of researches have obtained support for some
of the premises of the tripartite model. For example, some
studies have shown that negative affect correlates both with
anxiety and depression whereas positive affect only correlates
significantly with depression (Clark et al., 1994). However,
the findings of Burns and Eidelson (1998) did not support
the premises of the tripartite model, showing that nonspecific
symptoms of depression and anxiety were phenomenologically
distinct and could be combined into a cluster of negative
affect symptoms. Other researchers’ results allow integration
of both the specificity hypothesis and the tripartite model.
For example, using factor analysis on the symptoms of these
disorders, a lower first-order level of analysis was found to
suggest specificity, whereas a higher level of analysis
supported generality (Clark et al., 1994; Steer, Clark, Beck,
& Ranieri, 1995). In addition, Jolly and Kramer (1994) found
that internalizing cognitions showed a similar hierarchical
arrangement.
The study of the link between self-talk and
psychopathology has been determined, to some extent, by
the methods of cognitive evaluation, with endorsement
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methods being the most commonly used in clinical practice
as well as in cognitive-clinical research (Haaga, 1997).
Usually, individuals are presented with a list of thoughts
and asked to check off whether they experienced each
thought or to rate how frequently the self-statements have
occurred in a particular situation or period of time (Glass
& Arnkoff, 1997). Most self-talk questionnaires are
administered retrospectively (see, for example, the Automatic
Thoughts Questionnaire Revised—ATQ-R, Kendall, Howard,
& Hays, 1989, and the Cognitions Checklist-Anxiety—CCL-
A, Beck et al., 1987) and are consequently subject to
problems of selective memory. A different strategy consists
of presenting individuals with a series of imaginary situations
and asking them to indicate the extent to which they would
think each of the proposed self-statements. This method
assesses self-talk concurrently and has been used in the
Burnett Self-Talk Inventory (BSTI, Burnett, 1996). However,
this approach might imply different processes because in
the BSTI, the number of situations involved is constant for
all individuals whereas in other questionnaires, it is variable
and depends on the events that have happened to each person
in real life (Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002). 
Regarding the cognitive content, a number of
endorsement measures of self-talk provide valence-based
scores, that is, scores focused on the positive versus negative
nature of inner speech (e.g., Burnett, 1996; Ingram, Kendall,
Siegle, Guarino, & McLaughlin, 1995). Questionnaires based
exclusively on the valence pose the problem that, under the
headings of negative and positive thoughts, cognitions of a
very different nature are assessed. Nonetheless, most of the
questionnaires have focused on self-talk related to some
disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, pain), and the items have
frequently been obtained from the thoughts reported in
clinical samples. For instance, following the content-
specificity theory, the differentiation of anxious and
depressive internal dialogue has been the focus of some
questionnaires such as the Anxious Self-Talk Questionnaire
(ASSQ, Kendall & Hollon, 1989), the CCL-A (Beck et al.,
1987), and the Cognitions Checklist-Depression (CCL-D,
Beck et al., 1987). 
The use of questionnaires obtained from the thoughts of
clinical populations could pose problems about content
validity when they are employed in nonclinical populations.
The main purpose of this research was to develop a Self-
Talk Inventory for young students, who are the focus of
several psychological studies about the link between thoughts
and psychological adjustment. This inventory should fulfill
a number of conditions: (a) The situations and the self-
statements included should be representative of actual
experiences and thoughts that many students might have;
(b) Representativeness and categories of thoughts should be
determined by inter-rater agreement; (c) According to the
cognitive specificity theory, the inventory should include
categories of negative self-talk that are characteristic of
anxiety, depression, and anger; and (d) Positive and negative
self-talk should be represented by an equal number of self-
statements in order to allow estimation of SOM ratios and
contrasting the hypotheses about the valence of self-talk.
The structure of the Self-talk Inventory was examined
using confirmatory factor analysis. Whereas exploratory
factor analyses are adequate for the situations where links
between the observed and latent variables are uncertain,
confirmatory factor analyses minimize the impact of chance
and are more appropriate for testing established theories
(Byrne, 1998). In this study, negative cognitions were the
focus to contrast the hypotheses derived from the tripartite
model and the specificity theory. According to the tripartite
model, all the negative cognitions should load on a general
negative self-talk factor whereas, according to the specificity
hypothesis, the distinctive cognitions of each affective
disorder should load on different factors (i.e., Depressive
Thoughts, Anxious Thoughts, and Angry Thoughts). 
As a test of the criterion validity of the Self-Talk
Inventory, we examined the relationship between self-talk
dimensions and symptoms of three affective disorders
(anxiety, depression, and anger). Regarding the valence of
the cognitions, we posited the hypothesis that, according to
previous research, SOM ratios and negative cognitions would
show higher correlations with symptoms of affective
disorders than would positive cognitions. We also examined
the hypotheses derived from the specificity theory and
tripartite model. According to the tripartite model, no specific
cognitions would be associated with symptoms of each
affective disorder, and the lack of positive cognitions,
reflecting low positive affectivity, would be associated with
depression but not with anxiety. 
Method
Participants
The participants were 982 Spanish undergraduate students
from three universities of the Basque Country. The final
sample was made up of 376 men (38.3%) and 598 women
(60.9%), but sex data were missing for 8 subjects (0.8%).
The mean age was 20.35 (SD = 2.16) years. The participants
were selected by means of cluster sampling in order to
achieve representativeness with regard to courses and type
of study (e.g., Engineering, Psychology, Economics,
Education, and Enterprise Administration and Direction).
Measures
Self-Talk Inventory (STI). This inventory includes two
different scales: the Negative Self-Talk Scale and the Positive
Self-Talk Scale. Participants were asked whether they would
say to themselves each of 52 statements in response to 10
imaginary situations, using a 4-point response formatted
scale (1 = not very probable, 2 = somewhat probable, 3 =
quite probable, 4 = very probable). The items were obtained
from the reports of an independent group of 110 students
using a thought-listing procedure (Cacioppo, Hippel, &
Ernst, 1997). These students were asked to recall situations
that made them feel happy, anxious, angry, or depressed,
and to write down the thoughts that popped into their heads.
Approximately 500 reports were obtained and we selected
the most frequent positive and negative situations and the
reported self-talk. Critical life events, such as the death of
a relative, were not included. Self-talk that seemed peculiar
or atypical was also excluded when selecting the items. An
English translation of the resulting inventory is presented
in Appendix 11. 
The Negative Self-Talk Scale. This scale includes three
subscales that reflect three categories of thoughts: Anxious
Thoughts (9 items), Depressive Thoughts (11 items), and
Angry Thoughts (6 items). The Anxious-Thoughts category
includes perceptions of external or internal danger and threat.
The category of Depressive Thoughts includes negative self-
evaluations, perceptions of rejection, and self-blame. Angry
Thoughts reflect negative evaluations of other people’s
behavior and the intention to confront others. 
The Positive Self-Talk Scale. This scale includes 26 items
arranged in three subscales: Minimization (12 items), Coping
Self-Instructions (4 items), and Positive Orientation (10
items). Minimization reflects a tendency to minimize
problems or to offer an alternative view of them. Positive
Orientation consists of self-statements reflecting optimism
and positive evaluations of oneself or of circumstances.
Coping Self-Instructions include cognitions aimed at directing
thoughts or behavior positively and at influencing task
control and completion. 
We assigned the items of the STI to the six categories.
To test the procedure, three independent psychologists were
given the description of the six categories and asked to
assign each item to the most appropriate subset. Inter-rater
agreement was high, with a Kappa coefficient between .93
and .97. To compute SOM ratios, scores from the STI were
transformed to anchor them at zero (1 = 0, 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4
= 3), following the proposals of Schwartz and Garamoni
(1989) and Amsel and Fichten (1998). SOM ratios were
computed by dividing positive self-statement scores by
positive-plus-negative self-statement scores. 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale.
The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) was used as a measure of
depression symptoms. The CES-D consists of 20 statements
rated on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (rarely or
none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time). Previous
research with the Spanish version of the CES-D has
confirmed its factorial structure (Calvete & Cardeñoso,
1999).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The STAI (Spielberger,
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1988) is a widely used measure of
anxiety. The trait scale of the STAI is a 20-item self-report
measure of stable anxiety symptoms, such as feelings of
fear and tension, and autonomic nervous system
hyperactivity. Individuals rate each item using a 4-point
response scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much
so). Several studies have supported construct validity, test-
retest reliability, and adequate alpha coefficients for the
Spanish version of the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1988).
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-2).
The Trait-Anger Scale from the STAXI-2 (Spielberger,
Miguel-Tobal, Casado, & Cano-Vindel, 2000) was used as
a measure of trait anger. It contains 10 items that assess the
tendency to experience and express anger without any specific
provocation. Participants score items using a 4-point response
scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). Previous studies
have shown satisfactory psychometric properties for the
Spanish version of the STAXI (Spielberger et al., 2000). 
Procedure
The students filled in the questionnaires in a classroom
setting. The questionnaires were presented in a packet so
that participants could record their answers on a computer
response-sheet. The participants completed the questionnaires
anonymously and did not receive course credit for
participation. The questionnaires took about 45 minutes to
complete. Questionnaires were presented in the following
order: STI, STAI, CES-D, and STAXI.
Results
Measurement Models of the Self-Talk Inventory
The parameters for confirmatory factor analysis were
estimated using the covariance matrixes of the items from
the STI. After testing that both the matrix and the distribution
of the variables were adequate, the fit of the different models
of this study was tested via maximum likelihood estimation
with LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2001). Following
the recommendations from a number of authors (e.g., Hoyle
& Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1998), goodness of fit was
assessed by the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Non-
Normed Fit Index (NNFI). In addition, the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) was used because it has
been recommended as a basis for power analysis and model
evaluation (MacCallum & Hong, 1997). Generally, NNFI
and CFI values of .90 or above reflect good fit, and RMSEA
values lower than .10 indicate an adequate fit.
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First, we tested the hypothesis that the STI structure
could be represented by 6 correlated first-order factors
(Model 1). The factor-loading matrix was full and fixed.
Each item had a nonzero loading on the latent variable that
it was designed to measure, and zero loading on the other
factors. The error variance-covariance matrix was
symmetrical, with diagonal elements free and off-diagonal
elements fixed at zero. This model was a good fit to the
data, c2(1259, N = 982) = 5285, RMSEA = .062, NNFI =
.89, CFI = .90. Table 1 presents the factor loadings, which
in all cases, were statistically different from zero (|T-value|
> 1.96). Next, we estimated two alternative models: a
structure made up of two first-order-factors (Model 2:
positive vs. negative thoughts), and a hierarchical model
(Model 3), with two broad categories of self-talk (positive
vs. negative thoughts) explaining covariances among the six
specific categories of self-talk. Model 2 showed an
inadequate fit to the data, c2 (1273, N = 982) = 9839,
RMSEA = .098, NNFI = .77, CFI = .78. Model 3 obtained
better fit indexes than Model 2, c2 (1267, N = 982) = 6804,
RMSEA = .053, NNFI = .89, CFI = .89. In this model, the
factor loadings of Depressive Thoughts, Anxious Thoughts,
and Angry Thoughts on Negative Thoughts were .99, .62,
and .30, respectively. The factor loadings of Minimization,
Positive Orientation, and Coping Self-Instructions on Positive
Thoughts were .92, .42, and .53, respectively. However, the
comparison with Model 1 showed that Model 3 was
untenable because it significantly increased the chi-squared
value, Dc2 (8, N = 982) = 1519, p < .001.
Because the focus of this study was on the negative
categories of self-talk, we estimated a series of additional
confirmatory factor analyses with the Negative Self-Talk
Scale to test the hypotheses concerning negative thoughts.
The hypothesized model for this scale consisted of an oblique
model with three first-order factors: Anxious Thoughts,
Depressive Thoughts, and Angry Thoughts. This model
provided a good fit to the data, c2 (296, N = 982) = 1923,
RMESA = .08, NNFI = .92, and CFI = .93. Next, we
estimated two alternative models of negative cognitions in
order to compare them with the hypothesized model: a two-
factor oblique structure in which anxiety-related thoughts
and depression-related thoughts were included in the same
factor, as predicted by the tripartite model of anxiety and
depression, and a one-factor structure. The one-factor model
did not fit the data adequately, c2 (296, N = 982) = 4170,
RMSEA = .14, NNFI = .82, CFI = .84. The three-factor
oblique model significantly reduced the value of chi-square
in comparison to the two-factor model, c2 (2, N = 982) =
525, p < .0001. 
The alpha values and the correlation coefficients between
the self-talk scores are displayed in Table 2. The Negative
Self-Talk subscales were significantly intercorrelated, with
the highest coefficient between Anxious Thoughts and
Depressive Thoughts. The Positive Self-Talk subscales were
also significantly intercorrelated. Although the correlation
between the Positive Self-Talk Scale and the Negative Self-
Talk Scale was near zero (.07), Minimization correlated
negatively with Anxious Thoughts and Depressive Thoughts,
and Angry Thoughts was associated positively with Positive
Orientation and Coping Self-Instructions. The alpha
coefficients for all the scales and subscales were adequate,
except for Coping Self-Instructions.
Table 1
Factor Loadings of the Self-Talk Inventory
Negative Self-Talk Scale                                                      Positive Self-Talk Scale
Depressive Thoughts    Anxious Thoughts      Angry Thoughts         Minimization Positive Orientation  Coping
Self-Instructions
Item Nr. Factor Item Nr. Factor Item Nr. Factor Item Nr. Factor Item Nr. Factor Item Nr. Factor
loading loading loading loading loading loading
1 .52   5 .54   23 .63   4 .40   34 .39   8 .39    
2 .53 7 .52 24 .51 9 .54 35 .39 31 .40
3 .46 19 .44 25 .80 13 .43 36 .41 43 .62
6 .60 38 .77 26 .57 14 .51 37 .48 44 .54
10 .61 39 .77 27 .83 15 .46 46 .44
11 .62 40 .69 28 .62 20 .39 47 .40
12 .57 41 .75 21 .41 48 .40
16 .50 42 .75 22 .45 50 .60
17 .56 49 .45 29 .39 51 .69
18 .51 30 .39 52 .66
32 .49 33 .49
45 .51
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Self-Talk Dimensions and Affective Problems
Table 2 also presents the zero-order correlation
coefficients among the Self-Talk scores and the symptoms
of affective disorders. With the exception of Coping Self-
Instructions, all the Self-Talk scores were associated
significantly with symptoms of depression, anxiety, and
anger. We used a t-test to examine the differences between
pairs of correlation coefficients, following the procedure
proposed by Cohen and Cohen (1983)2. When total scores
were examined, SOM ratio showed higher coefficients with
symptoms of depression and anxiety than did Negative Self-
Talk scores and Positive Self-Talk scores—that is, anxiety
symptoms correlated higher with SOM ratio than with
Negative Self-Talk scores, t(979) = 2.66, p < .01—and anger
correlated higher with total Negative Self-Talk scores than
with SOM ratio, t(979) = 3.53, p < .01. When subscales
were examined, Depressive Thoughts correlated higher with
symptoms of depression and anxiety than the total Negative
Self-Talk scores, but similarly to the SOM ratio. In general,
anger presented lower correlation coefficients with all Self-
Talk scores than the other affective problems, showing the
highest coefficient with the total Negative Self-Talk scores;
for example, the coefficient between Negative Self-Talk
scores and anger was higher than the coefficient between
Depressive Thoughts and anger, t(979) = 3.53, p < .05.
Among the Positive Self-Talk subscales, Minimization had
the highest correlation coefficient with symptoms of anxiety
and depression, whereas anger correlated similarly with
Positive Orientation and Minimization, t(979) = 0.05, ns. 
The correlation between symptoms of anxiety and
depression was .70, and the correlations between anger and
anxiety and depression were .43 and .32, respectively. Given
this overlap, the fit of the data to the specificity theory was
examined using a multivariate strategy. We conducted a series
of multiple regression analyses to determine which self-talk
categories were associated with each of the measures of
symptoms (depression, anxiety, and anger). Results are
summarized in Table 3. In the first regression analysis, CES-
D scores were used as the criterion variable and Self-Talk
subscales were entered simultaneously in the equation as
predictor variables. The regression coefficients of Depressive
Thoughts and Positive Orientation were statistically significant.
Due to the high association between symptoms of depression,
anxiety, and anger, the regression analysis was repeated with
the anxiety and anger scores entered in the model as predictors
in the first step, and the Self-Talk subscales in the second
step. This provided an opportunity to assess the relative
strength of the association between these Self-Talk subscales
and depression while controlling the influence of the other
two variables. Table 3 also shows the results of this analysis.
The regression coefficients of Depressive Thoughts and
Positive Orientation remained significant. In addition, Anxious
Thoughts and Minimization showed significant but low
regression coefficients. In a second set of regressions, anxiety
scores were used as criterion variable and Self-Talk subscales
2 The applicable formula is: t = (rxy – rzy)* SQRT[{(N – 3)(1 + rxz)}/ {2(1 – rxy2 – rxz2 – rzy2 + 2rxy*rxz*rxy)}]. This formula tests
for a significant difference between the correlation between variables X and Y and the correlation between variables Z and Y. The formula
yields a t statistic with n – 3 degrees of freedom.
Table 2
Zero-order Correlations, Descriptive Statistics, and Alpha Coefficients of the Self-Talk Scores and Measures of Psychological
Symptoms
Scales                         1      2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   11       M        SD  Skewness  Kurtosis a 
1. Depressive Thoughts            22.36  6.18  0.47 -0.03 .83  
2. Anxious Thoughts   .67           21.05  5.96   0.17 –0.64 .87  
3. Angry Thoughts   .26 .18          16.66  3.99 –0.35 –0.31 .82  
4. Negative Self-Talk Scale   .89   .86 .51        60.07 12.47 –0.03  0.19 .90  
5. Minimization –.39 –.32 .03 –.34        30.79  5.31 –0.17 –0.03 .73  
6. Positive Orientation   .04 –.004 .20  .08  .35    —      23.82  4.65  0.21 –0.07 .74  
7. Coping Self-Instructions .10 .07 .38 .19 .43  .37      10.80  2.28 –0.26  0.19 .44  
8. Positive Self-Talk Scale –.14 –.14  .23 –.07 .80  .78  .70     65.41  9.32  0.26 –0.24 .80 
9. SOM ratio –.76 –.75 –.33 –.84 .66 .34 .13 .57    55.00  0.11 –0.08  0.08       —  
10. Depression symptoms .42 .29 .11 .38 –.30 –.19 –.04 –.43 –.25   18.13  9.73  0.91  1.18 .90  
11. Anxiety symptoms  .54 .44  .12  .51 –.38 –.15 –.05 –.55 –.27 .69  18.20  7.71  0.57  0.02 .88  
12. Anger symptoms  .31  .23  .26  .34 –.17  .15 .07 –.28 .01 .31 .39 22.16 4.97  0.38  0.10 .81 
Note. All the correlation coefficients are statistically significant at p < .0001 except for those in boldface. Correlations between symptoms
and self-talk scores are indicated in the framed cell.
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as predictors. Four Self-Talk subscales were significantly
linked to anxiety symptoms: Depressive Thoughts, Anxious
Thoughts, Minimization, and Positive Orientation. When the
analysis was repeated with symptoms of depression and anger
entered in the first step, the coefficient of Positive Orientation
was nonsignificant. Lastly, the same procedure was performed
to assess the association between the Self-Talk subscales and
symptoms of anger. The coefficients of Depressive Thoughts,
Angry Thoughts, Minimization, and Positive Orientation were
significant. When anxiety and depression scores were entered
in a first step, the regression coefficient of Depressive
Thoughts was nonsignificant. 
To further explore whether Self-Talk scores were
associated with psychological symptoms at the clinical level,
we used cut-off scores to identify participants with scores
within the borderline or clinical range. Usually, CES-D scores
higher than 16 are considered of clinical interest, whereas a
cut-off of 30 indicates highly symptomatic individuals (Boyd,
Weissman, Thompson, & Myers, 1982). We compared
participants within the clinical range (CESD-D scores > 30)
with the normal group (CES-D scores < 16) in the Self-Talk
subscales that showed significant coefficients in the above
regression analyses. Table 4 presents the means and standard
deviations of the cognitive variables in both groups. The
Table 3
Summary of Regression Analysis Testing the Association Between Self–Talk Subscales and Symptoms of Depression, Anxiety,
and Anger
Analyses excluding the other symptoms from the model      Analyses with the other symptoms included in the model
Outcome: Depression Symptoms  B      SE     b t               Step R2 change                 B      SE   b t               Step R2 change
Step 1          R2 = .50, F(2, 761) =381** 
Anxiety      0.70 .04 .66 19.40**      
Anger      0.10 .06 .05 1.67   
Step 2    R2 = .22, F(6, 861) = 41** DR2 = .02, F(6, 755) = 5** 
Depressive Thoughts 0.62 .07 .38 9.38**  0.21 .06 .13 3.58**      
Anxious Thoughts 0.01 .07 .00 0.00  –0.12 .06 –.07 –2.15*      
Angry Thoughts 0.15 .08 .06 1.85 0.01 .07 .01 0.04      
Minimization –0.13 .07 –.07 –1.82 0.13 .06 .07 2.05*      
Positive Orientation –0.42 .07 –.20 –5.82**  –0.27 .06 –.12 –4.33**      
Coping Self-Instructions 0.01 .15 .01 0.09  –0.09 .13 –.02 –0.68   
Outcome: Anxiety Symptoms B SE     b t Step R2 change         B SE b t Step R2 change  
Step 1        R2 = .54, F(2, 761) = 454** 
Depression     0.46 .02 .51 19.40**      
Anger      0.32 .05 .17 6.73**   
Step 2     R2 = .34,  F(6, 904) = 77** DR2 = .08, F(6, 755) = 28** 
Depressive Thoughts 0.60 .06 .40 10.87**  0.21 .05 .14 4.39**      
Anxious Thoughts 0.20 .06 .13 3.58**  0.21 .05 .13 4.64**      
Angry Thoughts 0.07 .07 .03 1.07  –0.01 .06 –.01 –.013      
Minimization –0.26 .06 –.15 –4.39**  –0.23 .05 –.13 –4.55**      
Positive Orientation –0.24 .06 –.12 –3.91**  –0.08 .05 –.04 –1.49      
Coping Self-Instructions 0.10 .13 .03 0.80  0.11 .11 .03 1.03   
Outcome: Anger                  B SE     b t Step R2 change         B SE b t Step R2 change  
Step 1          R2 = .19, F(2, 761) = 87** 
Anxiety     0.18 .03 .34 6.73**      
Depression    0.04 .02 .08 1.67   
Step 2     R2 = .16, F(6, 898) = 29**     DR2 = .08, F(6, 755) = 13** 
Depressive Thoughts 0.14 .03 .17 4.05**  0.02 .04 .03 0.62      
Anxious Thoughts 0.03 .03 .04 1.00  –0.01 .04 –.01 –0.27      
Angry Thoughts 0.23 .04 .18 5.69**  0.21 .04 .17 5.04**      
Minimization –0.16 .04 –.17 –4.39**  –0.10 .04 –.10 –2.53*      
Positive Orientation 0.17 .04 .16 4.67**  0.21 .04 .20 5.53**      
Coping Self-Instructions –0.01 .08 –.01 –0.08  0.01 .08 .01 0.03   
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001 
analysis of variance revealed statistically significant differences
in all variables. Cohen (1988) proposed small, medium, and
large effect sizes (.2, .5, and .8) as a guide to interpret results.
Using this guideline, a large effect was found for Depressive
Thoughts, and medium effects were found for Anxious
Thoughts and Minimization. For anxiety and anger symptoms,
participants within the normal range (percentile < 75) and
clinical range (percentile > 90) were compared3. Differences
between subgroups in anxiety scores were large in all cognitive
variables, whereas differences between subgroups in anger
were large only in Angry Thoughts.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to develop an inventory to
assess self-talk in young people from nonclinical populations,
and to study the relation between thoughts and symptoms
of affective disorders that derives from cognitive models.
This inventory consists of two scales: the Negative Self-Talk
Scale and the Positive Self-Talk Scale, and has the following
characteristics: First, it assesses self-talk concurrently by
using ten imaginary situations. Second, both the situations
and the self-statements were obtained from true reports from
a previous group of 110 students. Third, the negative self-
talk categories are based on the cognitive content-specificity
theory (Beck et al., 1987), and the positive categories reflect
self-talk dimensions that were previously reviewed in the
literature (Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002; Kendall & Chansky,
1991; Prins & Hanewall, 1997). Fourth, the adequacy of
including the items in the categories was based on inter-rater
agreement. And last, the Positive Self-Talk Scale has the
same number of items as the Negative Self-Talk Scale in
order to facilitate estimation of SOM-ratios.
The results confirmed the hypothesized six-factor structure
of the Self-talk Inventory (Depressive Thoughts, Anxious
Thoughts, Angry Thoughts, Minimization, Positive Orientation,
and Coping Self-Instructions). In addition, findings concerning
the structure of the Negative Self-Talk Scale provided support
for the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis, because the
confirmatory factor analyses showed that a three-factor model
(Angry Thoughts, Anxious Thoughts, and Depressive Thoughts)
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3 We used cut-off scores obtained in Spanish samples for the STAI and STAXI (Spielberger et al., 1988, 2000). 
Table 4
Differences in Cognitive Variables between Normal, Borderline, and Clinical Subgroups
Subgroups for depression symptoms
Normal range, n = 462 Clinical range, n = 122 
M                    SD                   M                    SD               F(1, 582)          Effect Size
Depressive thoughts 20.34 5.49 26.71 6.81 116.83** –1  
Anxious Thoughts 19.62 5.53 23.29 6.70  38.70** –0.63  
Minimization 31.73 5.26 28.73 5.45  30.97**  0.57  
Positive Orientation 24.34 4.77 22.69 4.91  11.44**  0.34   
Subgroups for anxiety symptoms
Normal range, n = 642 Clinical range, n = 76 
M                    SD                   M                    SD               F(1, 724)          Effect Size
Depressive Thoughts 20.90 5.48 29.76 6.54 170.11** –1.58  
Anxious Thoughts 19.90 5.47 25.97 6.09  81.76** –1.10  
Minimization 31.68 5.05 26.32 5.38  75.62**  1.10   
Subgroups for anger symptoms
Normal range, n = 632 Clinical range, n = 102 
M                    SD                   M                    SD               F(1, 732)          Effect Size
Angry Thoughts 16.14 3.92 19.15 3.67 52.48** –0.77  
Minimization 31.16 5.18 29.37 5.68 10.14*  0.34  
Positive Orientation 23.59 4.60 25.50 5.01  14.80** –0.41  
Note. A negative effect size indicates a higher score for the clinical subgroup.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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fit the data better than did the one- (Negative Cognitions) or
two-factor (Angry and Anxious-Depressive Thoughts) models.
The latter two would have supported the tripartite model of
anxiety and depression. Our results are consistent with the
findings of Burns and Eidelson (1998) when they studied the
factor structure of the items to measure anxiety and depression.
Alpha coefficients were adequate for all the subscales of the
inventory except in the case of the Coping Self-Instructions
subscale. Future research with the STI should not only confirm
the structure of the instrument in different samples but also
improve the Coping Self-Instructions subscale.
Regarding the relation between categories of self-talk, we
highlight the following conclusions: First, in this study, no
correlation was obtained between the total scores of positive
and negative self-talk, in contrast to the results of other studies
in which a low negative correlation was observed between
both types of self-talk (Burgess & Haaga, 1994; Calvete &
Cardeñoso, 2002; Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005; Ingram et
al., 1995; McDermut & Haaga, 1994). However, the analysis
of the correlations between the subscales indicated that the
subscale of Minimization was negatively related to depression-
and anxiety-related cognitions, and that anger-related
cognitions were positively associated with Positive Orientation
and Coping Self-Instructions. The latter result may be masking
the relation between the total scores on Negative Self-Talk
Scales and Positive Self-Talk Scales, because most of the
current scales to study self-talk do not include anger-related
cognitions. Second, Depressive Thoughts and Anxious
Thoughts were highly correlated. This correlation is consistent
with the overlap between depression and anxiety (Clark &
Watson, 1991). Last, the results concerning Coping Self-
Instructions are mixed. On the one hand, this subscale
correlates positively with the other two Positive Self-Talk
subscales, but, on the other hand, it also correlates positively
with the Angry Thoughts and Depressive Thoughts. This result
underscores the problem when conceptualizing this type of
self-talk, which has already been reported in other studies.
For example, Kendall and Chansky (1991) suggested that
coping self-instructions could be a negative thought category.
Nevertheless, the low consistency of this subscale precluded
drawing any robust conclusions. 
As a way of testing the empirical validity of the STI, we
assessed the relationships between the Self-Talk scores and
symptoms of affective disorders. Regarding the hypothesis
about the valence of thoughts, our results indicated that both
SOM ratios and negative self-talk were more closely
associated with the psychological symptoms than was positive
self-talk. This result is consistent with other previous studies
(Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005; Treadwell & Kendall, 1996).
The subscales based on cognitive content were employed to
study the specificity hypothesis. Similarly to previous studies,
our results revealed the difficulty of evaluating the theory
of cognitive specificity, given the high degree of overlap
among affective problems. We tried to examine this theory
by means of multiple regression analyses, controlling
statistically the effect of the variables that could be
confounding the results. In accordance with this strategy, in
the case of depression, the data were congruent with the
cognitive specificity theory, because symptoms of depression
were mainly associated with a higher presence of depressive
cognitions, whereas angry and anxious cognitions seemed
irrelevant. On the other hand, the results for symptoms of
anxiety were not congruent with the theory of cognitive
specificity, because anxiety scores were associated with both
anxious cognitions and depressive cognitions. Hence,
depressive self-statements were not uniquely associated with
symptoms of depression. This result is similar to that obtained
by Lerner et al. (1999) with children. Lastly, in the case of
anger, although modest, our results also tend to support the
specificity hypothesis. When the influence of symptoms of
anxiety and depression were controlled, angry cognitions
were the only type of negative thought associated with anger. 
The results concerning the Positive Orientation subscale
provided support for the tripartite model. This subscale reflects
optimism and a positive view, which could be conceptualized
as the cognitive dimension of positive affect. When the overlap
between psychological problems was controlled, there was
no association between Positive Orientation and symptoms
of anxiety, whereas there was an association between
symptoms of depression and Positive Orientation. This result
is consistent with the tripartite model, which states that positive
affect is unique to depression and irrelevant to anxiety (Clark
et al., 1990), and is congruent with the results of other studies.
For example, Burgess and Haaga (1994) also found that
positive self-statements showed strong negative associations
with depression rather than with anxiety. In addition, as in
our study, Jolly and Wiesner (1996) observed that when the
depression score was controlled, anxiety and positive affect
were not associated. Moreover, in this study, we found that
the three affective problems were different with regard to this
type of self-talk: Positive Orientation correlated positively
with anger, negatively with symptoms of depression, and was
not significantly associated with symptoms of anxiety. The
correlation between Positive Orientation and anger is in
accordance with the results of several studies about the
cognitive characteristics of aggressive individuals, which
indicate that aggressive behavior could be linked to an unusual
endorsement of positive affect in several settings (Edens et
al., 1999; Lochman & Dodge, 1994). All these results suggest
that, although negative thinking and the SOM ratio are more
predictive of psychological maladjustment, positive thinking
may be the most promising for discriminating between
different emotional disorders. 
This study has a number of shortcomings. First, although
overall characteristics of the STI are adequate, it presents
limitations that should be improved in future versions of
the inventory. For example, the Coping Self-Instructions
subscale exhibited poor internal consistency, likely due to
the insufficient number of items. Moreover, the number of
items in the subscales was unevenly distributed across
situations, and, from a psychometric perspective, this
unbalanced number of categories of self-talk per situation
could affect the strength of the measure negatively. However,
the solution to this problem is complex because the results
of the thought-listing procedure indicated that each type of
situation was more likely linked to some types of self-talk
than to others. This result is consistent with the structure of
the BSTI (Burnett, 1996), which also was developed from
thought-listing and presents a similar unbalanced number
of categories. Second, the measure of anxiety employed
(STAI) includes items such as blue mood, crying, and
unhappiness, which may be more characteristic of depression,
and, consequently, may have confounded the results about
the lack of specificity for anxiety. Third, the content overlap
between measures could inflate the association between
negative self-talk categories and symptoms of affective
problems (McPherson & Lakey, 1993), leading to a biased
superiority of negative thinking to predict psychological
problems4. Last, although university students are the focus
of several studies, it is necessary to confirm the validity of
the STI when used in different samples, including clinical
samples. Although we tried to examine whether Self-Talk
scores were associated with psychological problems at the
clinical level, this approach was only tentative, and
participants who scored above the predetermined cut-off
levels on the screening measures should be interviewed more
specifically for a diagnosis of affective disorders.
In summary, the instrument developed in this research
has some positive characteristics, such as the inclusion of
several categories of self-talk and its factorial structure,
which future research should confirm. On the other hand,
this study offers mixed results about the specificity
hypothesis and emphasizes the role of positive thinking in
the differentiation of depression, anxiety, and anger. 
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* Your friends went out to a party last Saturday and on Monday,
you hear them remarking what fun they had, but nobody had
told you that they were going out. Then, you think:
1. I feel rejected.
2. They don’t want me in their group; they are better off
without me.
3. It’s my own fault; I must have done something wrong.
4. Surely, they didn’t realize it and they didn’t do it on purpose.
* You see the bus arriving and run to catch it. When you are two
meters away and the doors have just opened, the people in line
pile up at the doors, and you slip and fall down. Then, you think:
5. I feel so embarrassed.
6. They sure must think I’m clumsy.
7. I wish I could just disappear!
8. I must try to do things without hurrying.
9. This can happen to anyone.
* You come across a boy/girl you have met recently and whom
you have bumped into several times. You say “hello” but he/she
doesn’t respond. Then you think:
10. I’m not interesting enough.
11. I’m sure that he/she doesn’t like me.
12. Everybody ignores me.
13. I’m sure he/she did not hear me.
14. Take it easy, there’s an explanation for everything.
15. I shouldn’t let it bother me.
* You are at home and you put on an old tracksuit to go down
and buy some bread. As you leave your house, you bump into a
university classmate whom you have recently met. Then, you
think:
16. I look terrible.
17. I’m sure he/she is thinking how awful I look.
18. I should be more careful about my appearance.
19. He/She is going to laugh at me.
20. I don’t care, I feel O.K.
21. He/She probably didn’t even notice what I was wearing.
22. It doesn’t matter, some other day he/she will see me looking
better.
* A person from your (academic) group did not do the tasks
he/she was supposed to do. This is not the first time that this
person does not do his/her share. Then, you think:
23. He/She always waits for me to do it.
24. As soon as he/she arrives, I’m going to tell him/her what
I think.
25. I’m fed up!
26. I’m sure that I will have to end up doing his/her work.
27. What nerve! He/she always does the same thing.
28. He/She should collaborate with the rest.
29. Maybe there is something wrong, or he/she has some
problem?
30. It’s not so important. He/she will eventually do his/her share.
* You arrive at the bus stop just when the bus is leaving and you
miss it. The next bus will take an hour to arrive. Then, you think:
31. What can I do now? Maybe I can read something, or go
and see the shop-windows...
32. I always have such rotten luck.
33. Oh, well, it’s not so bad.
* They just tell you that you passed the exam you took last week.
Then, you think:
34. If I can pass that exam, I can pass the rest of the exams.
35. It was worth the effort.
36. I must go and tell everyone...
37. I’m cool!
* You have to expound a work in front of the class. Then, you
think:
38. I’ll blush and everyone will realize how nervous I am.
39. I’m sure I’ll make a mistake and say something foolish.
40. I’m sure everyone will think I’m an idiot.
41. How awful! What an embarrassing situation!
42. I feel terrible!
43. Calm down, think a bit and don’t get blocked.
44. If I don’t think about all the people out there, I will do a
better job.
45. I’ll do a good job. There’s no reason why I shouldn’t.
* When you get home, they tell you that a friend from whom
you haven’t heard lately has phoned you. Then, you think:
46. For some reason, I impress people.
47. This is wonderful!
48. My friend is great: two months without seeing each other
and it seems that nothing has changed.
* At a family meal, your mother (or someone else with whom
you live) tells your relatives how proud she is of you because of
all your efforts at your studies and of your other positive qualities.
Then, you think:
49. My God, how embarrassing! I’m sure I must be blushing
like mad...
50. Well, modesty aside, the truth is that I deserve it.
51. They’re all so proud of me!
52. I feel great! 
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Appendix 1
Below are presented a series of scenarios and some thoughts that people may have. Please try to imagine yourself
as realistically as possible in each of these situations and indicate the probability with which you would endorse each
of the thoughts, using the following scale: 
1 = not very probable, 2 = somewhat probable, 3 = quite probable, 4 = very probable
SELF-TALK INVENTORY
